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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants Wade Massey and Capitol West Appraisals (hereinafter respectively "Massey" and 
"Capitol West," and collectively the "Massey Defendants"). 
The Massey Defendants contend that: (1) the District Court correctly ruled that the 
Defendants did not owe the Plaintiff a tort duty upon which to predicate its professional 
negligence cause of action; (2) the District Court did not rely on evidence not in the record; and 
(3) there were no genuine issues of material fact so as to preclude judgment as a matter of law in 
favor of the Massey Defendants. The Massey Defendants therefore respectfully urge the 
Supreme Court to affirm the District Court's judgment. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on April 12, 2010, in the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, County of Canyon. R Vol. I, p. 6-11. The Complaint alleged professional 
negligence, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. R Vol. I, p. 6-11. Thereafter, 
the parties engaged in written discovery and on May 17, 2011, deposed Massey and Plaintiffs 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b )(6) designee, Connie Miller.I 
The Massey Defendants moved for summary judgment on November 10, 2011. R Vol. I, 
p. 17-180. The Plaintiff, in tum, moved for summary judgment on November 15, 2011. R Vol. 
1 As of May 17, 2011, Connie Miller was President/CEO of Icon Federal Credit Union, which 
subrogated its claims to Plaintiff. The Plaintiff, therefore, "stands in the shoes" of Icon, f/n/a 
"Idahy". 
1l1ASSEY RESPONDENTS' BRIEF-PAGE 3 
I, p. 129-130. The District Court heard oral argument on the motions for summary judgment on 
February 9, 2012. R Vol. II, p. 194-205. At that hearing, the District Court advised counsel for 
the Massey Defendants that it did not have a copy of the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca, which the 
Massey Defendants had referenced over a dozen times in their supporting memorandum. R Vol. 
II, p. 194-205; R Vol. I, p. 113-128; Tr., February 9, 2012 hearing, p. 5-8. Counsel for the 
Plaintiff stated that he "believe[ d]" he had a copy of the Menchaca Affidavit and stipulated to 
admitting into the record. Tr., February 9, 2012 hearing, p. 5-6. 
In its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment dated February 17, 2012, the District 
Comi granted summary judgment in favor of the Massey Defendants, dismissing the Plaintiffs 
causes of action. R Vol. II, p. 194-205. Accordingly, the District Court stated that it did not 
need to reach Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.2 R Vol. II, p. 204. 
On March 1, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the District Court's 
Orders on Motions for Summary Judgment, arguing that material issues of fact precluded 
summary judgment. R Vol. II, p. 206-216. The District Court signed a Judgment dismissing the 
Plaintiffs claims with prejudice on March 15, 2012, and on March 22, 2012, the Massey 
Defendants filed a Motion for Costs and Attorneys' Fees. R Vol. II, p. 217-219. In its Order 
dated April 10, 2012, the District Court denied the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. R vol. 
2 Without citing to the record, the Plaintiff asserts on page 20 of its brief that the District Court 
did not "read" the Plaintiffs summary judgment papers. Counsel for the Massey Defendants 
cannot locate in the record where the District Court ever stated not "reading" the Plaintiffs 
moving papers. The District Court, however, did rule in its Order granting summary judgment in 
favor the Massey Defendants that it did not to "need reach" the Plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment. The fact that the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was rendered moot by the 
District Court's ruling is not equivalent to not "reading" the Plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment. 
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II, p. 260-269. On April 19, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Permit the Taking of Ernie 
Menchaca Deposition Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and Renewed Motion to Reconsider the Court's 
Order Granting Summary Judgment (hereinafter the "Renewed Motion to Reconsider"). R Vol. 
II, p. 270-275. In support of the Renewed Motion to Reconsider, the Plaintiff also filed the 
Affidavits of Patrick J. Collins and Jeffrey M. Wilson, which attested that neither had a copy of 
the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca that attorney Wilson previously had stipulated to the admission 
of into the record. R Vol. II, p. 276-285.After hearing from the parties on May 10, 2012, the 
District Court denied the Plaintiffs Renewed Motion. Tr., May 10, 2012 hearing, p. 30-31. It 
also awarded Defendants Massey costs, but declined to award attorneys' fees. A Supplemental 
Judgment was filed on June 21, 2012, and this appeal followed. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about June 13, 2007, Defendant Wade Massey ("Massey") performed an appraisal 
of the real property located at 16462 Plum Drive, Caldwell, Idaho 83607 for Clearwater 
Mortgage Inc. (the "Appraisal"). R Vol. I, p. 115. The Appraisal report identified Clearwater 
Mortgage as the "intended user," and Massey initially prepared it exclusively for that company 
to aid in its decision whether to extend Steven and Valerie Hruza ("Hruza") a loan. R Vol. I, p. 
115. Massey never thought that Idahy Federal Credit Union ("ldahy"), which now is known as 
Icon Federal Credit Union ("Icon"), was his client. R Vol. I, p. 115. In fact, Massey never 
communicated with anyone at ldahy about anything, including the appraisal. R Vol. I, p. 115. 
Nor did Massey know that Idahy had obtained a copy of the Appraisal until he was served the 
Complaint. R Vol. I, p. 115. 
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Massey emailed the draft copy of the Appraisal report to Cleaiwater Mortgage. R. Vol. I, p. 
115. Because the report was in preliminary draft fmm, Clearwater Mortgage did not rely upon it in its 
decision whether to loan Hruza money. R Vol. I, p. 115.. Cleaiwater Mortgage declined Hruza's loan 
application for reasons independent of the Appraisal. R Vol. I, p 116. Because Cleaiwater Mortgage 
declined Hruza's loan application, the President of Cleaiwater Mortgage, Ernie Menchaca and Massey 
decided that, in lieu of revising and completing the Appraisal, the Massey Defendants would forego any 
payment for the services provided. R Vol. I, p. 116. 
In or about September 2007, Idahy extended a loan to Hruza, which was secured by a second 
position secwity interest on their personal residence. R Vol. I, p. 116. Idahy claims to have relied on the 
Appraisal report, which stated that the value of Hruza's prope1iy was $1,150,000, but Idahy does not 
know how it obtained a copy of the Appraisal. R Vol. I, p. 116. Idahy never requested a letter of 
assignment from Cleaiwater Mortgage, Inc. to use or rely on the Appraisal, which is customary in the 
industry. R Vol I, p. 116. 
The Hruzas defaulted almost immediately. R Vol. I, p. 116. Hruza filed for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy protection on or about July 22, 2008. R Vol I, p. 116. Plaintiff, the fidelity bond insurer for 
Idahy, paid Idahy after Hruza's default. R Vol I, p. 116. 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court applies the same standard 
ofreview that the District Court did. See Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 
441, 235 P.3d 387, 391 (2010). Thepartymovingforsummaryjudgmentinitiallycarriestheburden 
to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a 
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matter oflaw. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct App. 1992). A mere scintilla 
of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge 
v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). There must be evidence upon which 
a jury could rely, see Johnson v. Gorton, 94 Idaho 595,495 P.2d 1 (1972), and evidence that gives rise to 
only the slightest doubt as to the facts does not preclude summary judgment. Tri-State Nat 7 Bank v. 
Westem Gateway Storage Co., 92 Idaho 543,447 P.2d 409 (1968). 
Moreover, it is well established that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is sought 
"may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence 
by way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a genuine 
issue of material fact." Olsen v. J A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,791 P.2d 1285 (1990); Clarke v. 
Prenger, 114 Idaho 766, 760 P.2d 1182 (1988);Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 
(1986). 
II. 
RESPONDENTS' RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES THAT 
HA VE BEEN PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY THE PLAINTIFF 
1. The District Court did not err in ruling that the Massey Defendants, who never 
communicated with Idahy, and which does not know how it obtained the Appraisal, did 
not owe a legal duty to Idahy. 
2. The Plaintiff was bound to its open court stipulation into the record of the Menchaca 
Affidavit. Alternatively, the Plaintiff invited error by stipulating to the admission of 
Menchaca Affidavit when it knew or should have known it lacked a copy of the 
document. 
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3. The District Court did not rely upon disputed material facts or draw impem1issible 
inferences therefrom when it ruled that the Massey Defendants did not owe the Plaintiff a 
legal duty upon which to base its professional negligence claim. 
4. The Massey Defendants respectfully request that the Supreme Court award them 




This is a professional negligence case. What makes this professional negligence 
litigation unique are the following undisputed facts: 
Idahy was not the Intended User of Massey's appraisal. R Vol. I, p. 110-112; 
Affidavit of Joe Huffman.3 
ldahy was not a Client of Massey. R. Vol. I, p. 110-112; Affidavit ofJoe Huffinan. 
There was no appraiser/client relationship between Massey and Idahy. R Vol. I, p. 110-
112; Affidavit of Joe Huffman. 
Massey has never spoken with anybody at Idahy and did not know Idahy had received a 
copy of the appraisal until after the borrowers, the Hruzas, ah-eady had defaulted. R Vol. 
I, p. 110-112; Affidavit ofJoe Huffman. 
• IdahydoesnotknowhowitobtainedMassey'sAppraisal. R Vol. I, p. 62-63; Affidavit 
of Joe Huffman. 
3 The District Court Clerk inadvertently omitted the Affidavit of Joe Huffman from the Record 
on Appeal. The Massey Defendants have filed a Motion to Augment the Record to include the 
Affidavit which has been granted by this Court. 
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• As between Massey and his Client/Intended User, Clearwater Mortgage, Inc., the Appraisal 
was an incomplete or inchoate work product that was not be relied upon. R Vol. I, p. 
110-111; R Vol. II, p. 192-193. 
The Appraisal was not assigned to Idahy. 
Based on these undisputed facts, the District Court correctly ruled that the Plaintiffs case lacked 
merit as a matter of law because the Massey Defendants did not owe the Plaintiff a legal duty. The 
Plaintiffs theory reduces to the absurd proposition that an appraiser owes a tort duty to an undefined 
and potentially limitless class ofthird-pa:tiynon-clients simply because they improperly obtained relied 
on a report that was intended for another, and which was undeniably rescinded by the parties who 
contemplated it. 
A. The District Court Correctlv Ruled that Massey Did Not Owe Idahy a Dutv 
Upon Which to Predicate its Professional Negligence Claim. 
The elements for a negligence cause of action are: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and 
(4) damages. See Black Canyon Raquetball Club, Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank, 199 Idaho 171, 
175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-06 (1991 ). The fundamental threshold element in a negligence action 
is the existence of a duty owed to another. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 
32, 39, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975)(emphasis added). It is well settled law that in Idaho "statutes 
and administrative regulations may define the applicable standard of care owed, and that 
violations of such statutes and regulations may constitute negligence per se. "Sanchez v. Galey, 
112 Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986). To form the basis for a negligence per se 
theory, the statute or regulation must: "( 1) clearly define the required standard of conduct; (2) 
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the statute or regulation must have been intended to prevent the type of harm the defendant's act 
or omission caused; (3) the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons the statute or 
regulation was designed to protect; and (4) the violation must have been the proximate cause of 
the injury." Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986); see also Stott 
By and Through Dougall v. Finney, 130 Idaho 894, 950 P.2d 709 (1997). 
Applying these principls to the undisputed facts compel only one reasonable conclusion: 
the Massey Defendants did not owe, assume or undertake any duty to Idahy whether arising out 
of common law principles or based on the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice 
(hereinafter "USPAP").4 To find a professional duty in these circumstances, where there was no 
professional relationship, privity or communication would be unprecedented, unwarranted and 
countervailing to all tort principles of law. 
1. The Plaintiff is Not a Member of the Class of Persons that USP AP 
Was Designed to Protect. 
The Plaintiff contends on appeal that the District Co mi erred because it allegedly failed to 
consider USP AP and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA). This argument misses the mark. The Plaintiff fails to inform the Supreme Court that 
in their opposition papers to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Massey Defendants 
submitted the Affidavit of Joe Huffman. Mr. Huffman's affidavit is the only expert evidence in 
the record demonstrating that Idahy was not a "Client" of Massey or an "Intended User" of the 
Appraisal report as defined by USP AP, and that any reliance on the Appraisal report by Idahy 
was improper. 
4 Idaho adopted USPAP. See l.D.A.P.A. § 24.18.01.004. 
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Indeed, application of the undisputed facts to the relevant provisions of USP AP proves 
that Massey did not owe a duty to Idahy to conform with the standards of practice prescribed 
therein. The linchpin to this argument is simple: as defined by USP AP, Idahy was neither a 
Client of Massey nor an Intended User of the inchoate appraisal. Furthermore, there was no 
appraisal "report" that was "transmitted" to Idahy. The District Court did not error in so 
concluding. 
USP AP defines a "Client" to be the party or parties who engage the appraiser (by 
employment or contract) in a specific assignment. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at il 5(b ). The 
Client is the party with whom the appraiser has an "appraiser-client relationship ... . "See id. In 
this case, Idahy was not Massey's Client under USPAP, and, significantly, Massey and Idahy 
never communicated with each other about the Appraisal or anything else. R Vol. I, p. 110-112 
Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at iii! 7, 8. Massey did not even know Idahy had obtained a copy of 
the inchoate Appraisal until he was served the Complaint. R Vol. I, p. 110-112. As to Massey, 
ldahy could have been anybody (and everybody) in the world. Massey did not owe Idahy a duty 
of care as contemplated by USP AP, as Idahy is no more "a member of the class of persons the 
statute or regulation was designed to protect" as any other person who somehow gets a hold of 
an appraiser's cast-off work product drafts without authorization. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho at 
617, 733 P.2d at 1242. The District Court correctly appreciated these facts and principles, and, 
as a result, correctly held that Massey did not owe or assume any duty towards Idahy. 
This is further supported by the fact Idahy was not an Intended User of the inchoate 
appraisal. An "Intended User" is the client and any other party as identified, by name or type, as 
users of the appraisal ... on the basis of communication with the client at the time of the 
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assignment. "5 See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ii 5( c) (emphasis added). Idahy was not the 
Client, as explained above, and was not identified in any manner as a user of the inchoate 
appraiser "on the basis of communication with client [Clearwater] at the time of the assignment." 
R Vol. I, p. 110-112 & Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ii 8. Furthermore, the inchoate appraisal was 
not assigned or otherwise transferred to Idahy. R Vol. II, p. 192-193. Incredibly, Idahy does not 
even know how it obtained a copy of the inchoate appraisal, yet still insists it is entitled to 
damages from Massey. R Vol. I, p. 62-63. 
Nor does the fact Idahy sent Massey a check after escrow closed on the Hruza loan alter 
the analysis. USP AP defines "Assignment" to be a "a valuation service provided as a 
consequence of an agreement between an appraiser and a client." See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, 
at ii 5( a). Under USP AP, the check or any payment is irrelevant, and did not retroactively create 
an appraiser/client relationship or duty as between Idahy and Massey. First, Idahy sent the check 
after it decided to loan the Hruzas the money6. R Vol. II, p. 174-176. Second, Massey only 
learned about the check after the fact. R Vol. II, p. 172. And third, USP AP clearly provides that 
it is the engagement, not payment, which gives rise to the client-appraiser relationship. 7 See 
Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ill 0. As discussed above, there was no communication between 
Idahy and Massey, let alone "Assignment." As such, there is no relationship from which a 
5 USP AP defines "Assignment" to be a "a valuation service provided as a 
consequence of an agreement between an appraiser and a client. See Affidavit of Joe 
Huffman, at ii 5(a). 
6 The check is dated 5 days after the settlement Statement. 
7 Notably, USP AP's position on how payment is irrelevant to the creation of an 
appraiser-client relationship is analogous to Massey's contention that there is no contract 
with Idahy because, among other reasons, there was no bargained for consideration. 
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breach could occur. 
Moreover, there was not an appraisal "Report," as that term is defined by USPAP, upon 
which to base the Plaintiff's causes of action. The fact that Idahy improperly obtained a copy of 
the appraisal does not mean it was entitled to rely on it anymore than a person who pulls a 
lawyer's draft opinion letter opining on the legality of a tax strategy from the garbage receptacle. 
USP AP defines "Report" to mean "any communication, written or oral, of an appraisal, 
appraisal review, or appraisal consulting service that is transmitted to the client upon completion 
of an assignment." See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at if 5(e). First, as analyzed above, there was 
no "Assignment" as between Idahy and Massey, as they never communicated with one another 
about anything, let alone forged an agreement. Therefore, there was no appraisal/client 
relationship upon which to predicate a claim based on a breach of standards of practice. Second, 
there was no "completion" of the "Assignment" between Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. because it 
and Massey mutually rescinded it. See, e.g., Pitner v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 94 Idaho 496, 
491P.2d1268 (1971)(A contract may be rescinded by mutual consent of the contracting parties). 
Third, Idahy was not a "Client." And fourth, the only evidence on point, the Affidavit of Ernie 
Menchaca, establishes that the Client, Clearwater, did not "transmit" or assign the appraisal 
draft. R Vol. II, p. 192-193. The Plaintiff cannot fail to controvert this evidence and expect to 
survive a motion for summary judgment. See Olsen v. J A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,791 P.2d 
1285 (1990) (stating that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is sought "may not merely 
rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by way of 
deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the contradict the assertions of the moving party"). 
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2. The Plaintiff Did Not Request the Court to Apply the Balance of 
Harms Test, But Even if it Had, the Test Demonstrates that the 
Massey Defendants Did Not Owe the Plaintiff a Legal Duty. 
On appeal the Plaintiff asserts for the first time that the District Court should have applied 
the balance of harms test to determine if the Massey Defendants owed the Plaintiff a tort duty. 
Because the Plaintiff did not raise this issue at the District Court, it is waived. 
"Substantive issues will not be considered the first time on appeal." Crowley v. 
Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 181 P.3d 435, 438 (2007). A party cannot "remain silent as to 
claimed error during a trial and later urge his objections thereto for the first time on appeal." 
Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d 355, 357 (1982). Failing to object to actions 
the District Court takes bars the party from challenging the District Court's action on appeal. 
See ,Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866, 204 P.3d 504, 506 (2009). 
The Massey Defendants, but not the Plaintiff, urged the District Court to apply the 
balance of harms test. None of the Plaintiff's briefing appears to request the District Court to 
apply the balance of harms test or refute the Massey Defendants' discussion of the test. In fact, 
the Plaintiff's briefing largely, if not entirely, ignores the key issue in this case, which is whether 
the Massey Defendants owed a tort duty to a lender with whom Massey had never communicated 
and which lender does not even know how it obtained the inchoate appraisal repo1i. Therefore, 
the Plaintiff waived the issue of whether the District Court erred in not applying the balance of 
harms test. See Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho at 512, 181 P.3d at 438. 
Even if the Plaintiff had not waived the balance of harms issue, the Massey Defendants 
owed the Plaintiff no duty under that test. In analyzing whether "to recognize a new duty or extend 
a duty beyond the scope previously imposed," the Supreme Court engages in a balance-of-the-harms test. 
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Vincent v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 136 Idaho 107,29 P.3d 943 (2001). The balance of harms test involves 
the consideration of 
policy and the weighing of factors, which include: the foreseeability of the harm to the 
plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered; the moral blame 
attached to the defendant's conduct; the policy of preventing future harm; the extent of the 
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise 
care with resulting liability for breach; and the availability, cost, and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved. Id. 
Applying these factors, the Massey Defendants did not owe Idahy, Plaintiff's subrogor, a duty of 
care. First, at the time Massey was preparing the appraisal, there was no foreseeability of harm to ldahy 
because Clearwater Mortgage, Inc. was Massey's client. R Vol. I, p. 110-112. It is undisputed that the 
appraisal did not identify Idahyas the "Intended User." R Vol. I, p. 110-112 & Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ir 
8. It is also undeniable that Massey never contemplated Idahy to be his client.R Vol. I, p. 110-112. 
Similarly, it is undisputed that Massey did not lmow that Idahy had received a copy of the appraisal, or as 
alleged by Plaintiff, that Idahy relied on it in making the loan to Hrnza, until well after the September 13, 
2007 close of escrow. R Vol. I, p. 110-112. Nor was there an assignment of the appraisal. R Vol. II, p. 192-
193. Simply put, the Massey Defendants could not have foreseen any harm to Idahy because at the time of 
preparing the appraisal, Idahy was not within the contemplation of the Massey Defendants. See id. 
Nor can a cogent argwnent be made that the Massey Defendants should have foreseen any ham1 to 
anybody. Based on his conversation with Mr. Menchaca, who was at all relevant times the president and 
CEO of Clearwater Mortgage, Massey understood the Appraisal to be inchoate and never to be completed, 
revised or finalized. R Vol. I, p. 110-11. Because Massey never contemplated that the inchoate Appraisal 
would be used or relied upon by anyone, it follows that it was not foreseeable that anyone would be 
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harmed by it. 
Other factors of the balance of harms test also demonstrate that the Massey Defendants did not owe 
any duty to Idahy. Because the appraisal was nothing more than an incomplete and preliminary draft, it 
follows, a fortiori, that the Massey Defendants could not have had any inkling, let alone a "degree of 
certainty," that Idahy or any other lender would suffer injury by way of the appraisal. Moreover, if 
Idahy had followed industry custom, it would have sought an assignment, at which point it 
would have learned there was no appraisal report to assign. R Vol. II, p. 192-193; Affidavit of Joe 
Hu:ffi11an at ~12. 
For the same reasons, no moral blame can be attached to the Massey Defendants' conduct. The 
appraisal was nothing more than an incomplete draft that was not to be used or relied upon. R Vol. I, p. 
110-112; R Vol. II, p. 192-193. While moral blame might exist if an appraiser intentionally put a defective 
appraisal into the stream of commerce intending that third-parties rely on it, there can be no moral blame for 
deciding, along with one's Client, not to complete the Appraisal. 
In sum, the Plaintiff waived any argument that the District Court erred in purportedly failing to 
apply the balance of harms test. But even if Plaintiff had not waived this issue, the Massey Defendants 
did not owe Idahy a duty of care under the balance of harms test. 
This conclusion accords with authority in other jurisdictions holding that, absent privity of 
contract, an appraiser cannot be liable for negligently preparing an appraisal relied on by a third-party who is 
not within a definable, fixed or contemplated assignment to the recipient. See, e.g., Webb v. Leclair, 933 
A.2d 177, 183 (Vt. 2007)(holding that appraiser did not owe duty to purchaser under negligence and 
negligent misrepresentation theory because no privity existed); Decatur Ventures, LLC v. Daniel, 485 F.3d 
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387, 390 (7th Cir. 2007)(under Indiana law real estate appraiser does not owe duty of care to buyer who the 
appraiser did not know, was not his client and was not a third-party beneficiary of contract between 
appraiser and client); Christiansen v. Roddy, 186 Cal.App.3d 780 (1986)(holding that appraiser did not owe 
duty of care to investors for whom the appraisal was not performed and where there was no evidence 
appraiser !mew or aware of the investors). 
B. The Plaintiff Was Bound to Its Open Court Stipulation Into the Record of 
the Menchaca Affidavit. Alternativelv, the Plaintiff Invited Error by 
Stipulating to the Admission of Menchaca Affidavit When it Knew or Should 
Have Known it Lacked a Copv of the Document. 
The Plaintiff incorrectly and misleadingly contends that the District Court relied on 
evidence not in the record, namely the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca. The reality is that Plaintiff 
is bound to its attorney's open court stipulation to the admissibility of the Affidavit of Ernie 
Menchaca. Alternatively, the Plaintiff's attorneys invited error by so stipulating and, as such, is 
barred from arguing that the District Court erred in relying on the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs argument on appeal, Mr. Menchaca's affidavit was in the record. 
After the District Court advised counsel that she did not have a copy of it, which the Massey 
Defendants cited to fourteen (14) times in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Plaintiff's counsel stipulated to its admission at the February 9, 2013, hearing. 
When the District Court asked whether Mr. Wilson had received it, he replied that he "believed 
so" and invited counsel for the Massey Defendants to "augment the record." See Tr. February 9, 
2012, hearing, at 5-6. A stipulation such as this, which was made in an open court, is final. See 
Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 35, 655 P.2d 926, 929 (1982). The 
affidavit was in the District Court records within hours of the hearing. And the only reason a copy was 
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not served on the Plaintiffs attorneys was because of Mr. Wilson's representation that he believed he 
had a copy of it. 
Moreover, the Plaintiffs innuendo laced argument that it was denied access to the Menchaca 
affidavit is, again, misleading and disingenuous. Admittedly, it .!§ likely the Affidavit of Ernie 
Menchaca was not served in accordance with Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7 (b )(1) with the Massey 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. But counsel for the Massey Defendants did not know 
this until the February 9, 2012, hearing. Despite it being referenced over a dozen times in the Massey 
Defendants' supporting memorandum, which undoubtedly led the District Court to search for it,8 and 
should have alerted both of Plaintiffs attorneys that they lacked all the papers, neither of the Plaintiffs 
two law :fin11S ever advised Massey's attorney of the issue. Tr., May 10, 2012 hearing, p. 30-31, 11. 20-
3. More importantly, after the February 9, 2012, hearing, neither Mr. Wilson nor Mr. Coldwell 
contacted Massey's counsel to advise that they in fact did not have the Menchaca Affidavit. As such, a 
copy was not served on either attorney after the hearing because Mr. Wilson previously had indicated 
that he had a copy. With these facts, the Supreme Court should hold the Plaintiffs attorneys to their 
stipulation. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff's attorneys invited error by stipulating to the admission of the 
Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca, and, as such, cannot be heard to complain about it on appeal. "It has 
long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain of errors one has acquiesced 
in or invited. Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible." Taylor v. 
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 833, 243 P.3d 642, 649 (2010), quoting State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 
8 Notably, the District Court found no merit in the Plaintiffs counsel's contention that it was 
denied access to the Affidavit, noting "[t]here is no indication whatsoever that it was withheld." 
Tr. May 10, 2012 hearing, p. 26-27, II. 25-6. 
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836, 838, 673 P.2d 436, 438 (1983). 
Here, the Plaintiffs attorney invited error by encouraging and inviting the District Court 
to admit into evidence the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca. Notably, the Plaintiff is not seeking 
relief under the so-called attorney incompetence exception to the invited eITor doctrine 
recognized in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 119 (Colo. 2002). 
Nor is the Plaintiff seeking relief from its stipulation. Instead, the Plaintiff is accusing the 
District Court of relying on evidence that they contend was not in the record, which is manifestly 
false. For the foregoing reasons the Plaintiff is bound to its attorney's stipulation to the 
admissibility of the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca. 
C. The District Court Did not Rely upon Disputed Material Facts or Draw 
Impermissible Inferences Therefrom When It Ruled that the Massey 
Defendants Did Not Owe the Plaintiff a Legal Duty Upon Which to Base its 
Professional Negligence Claim. 
The Plaintiff asserts on appeal that the District Court relied on "impermissible findings of 
fact" and made "improper inferences" in ruling that the Massey Defendants did not owe the 
Plaintiff a tort duty. Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that the District Court (1) did not 
consider Massey's acceptance of payment from Idahy; and (2) improperly relied on testimony by 
Icon President Connie Miller in which she informed defense counsel at the 30(b )(6) deposition of 
the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff did not know how it obtained a copy of the Massey's inchoate and 
incomplete appraisal. 
The Plaintiff is wrong. First, as demonstrated below, the District Court was aware that 
Massey's bookkeeper cashed a check from Idahy after the close of escrow on the Hruza loan. 
But the check was legally and factually iITelevant because it was not consideration for any 
professional services, did not indicate what it was for, or identify the property name. Second, 
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Connie Miller's deposition was a 30(b )(6) deposition of the Plaintiff. She knew her testimony 
was and is binding on the Plaintiff. Any argument to the contrary is frivolous. 
1. Massev's "Acceptance" of Payment is Legally and Factually 
Irrelevant. 
The Plaintiff's argument that the District Court erred in finding that the Massey 
Defendants did not owe a legal duty to the Plaintiff despite the Massey Defendants having 
accepted an $800.00 check from Idahy is unavailing. First, as discussed in more detail above, 
USP AP defines "Assignment" to be a "a valuation service provided as a consequence of an 
agreement between an appraiser and a client." See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ir 5(a). Under 
USP AP, the check or any payment is irrelevant, and did not create an appraiser/client 
relationship or duty as between Idahy and Massey. Second, Idahy sent the check after it already 
had decided to loan the Bruzas the money. 9R Vol. II, p. 174-175. Third, Massey only learned about 
the check after the fact and did not personally cash it. R Vol. II, p. 172. Fourth, the check lacks 
any information identifying the property to which it pertains. R Vol. II, p. 17 4. Thus, it provides 
no reason for anyone to think that Idahy relied on an appraisal that had been rescinded earlier by 
Massey and Clearwater Mortgage. As such, the District Court correctly perceived that the 
$800.00 check to be the red herring that it is. 
2. The Testimony of the Plaintifrs 30(b)(6) Designee, Connie Miller, Is 
Binding. 
The Plaintiff wrong! y suggests that the District Court made impermissible findings of fact 
and/or inferences on the issue of how Idahy obtained the appraisal by contending that its own 
9 The check is dated 5 days after the settlement Statement. The proverbial cat was 
already out of the bag. 
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30(b)(6) designee, Connie Miller, was not really testifying on behalf of the Plaintiff. The 
argument is unavailing because Ms. Miller's testimony is binding on the Plaintiff. 
In depositions noticed pursuant to 30(b )(6), "the deponent's testimony is the 
corporation's testimony, and if the corporation is a party, the testimony may be used at trial by 
an adverse party for any purpose." See Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Tyco 
Int 'l Ltd., 253 F.R.D. 524, 525-26 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see also Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. 
C01p., 261 F.R.D. 34, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[I]t is settled law that a party need not produce the 
organizational representative with the greatest lmowledge about a subject; instead, it need only 
produce a person with knowledge whose testimony will be binding on the party."). 
Here, the Massey Defendants noticed the 30(b )(6) deposition of the Plaintiff. R Vol. I, p. 
1. The Plaintiff, in tum, designated Connie Miller to testify, including regarding how Idahy 
obtained a copy of the appraisal. Ms. Miller understood that her testimony was binding on the 
company, and that she was not answering questions on her own behalf. R Vol. I, at p. 58. Ms. 
Miller also unequivocally testified that the company did not know how it obtained a copy of the 
appraisal. R Vol. I, at 62-63. The Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the clear law and unequivocal 
facts lacks merit and is frivolous. 
Moreover, the Plaintiffs argument that the District Court's ruling should be reversed 
because a question of material fact exists as to how Idahy obtained the appraisal also is 
unavailing. It is well established that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is sought "may 
not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by 
way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a genuine issue 
of material fact." Olsen v. J A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,791P.2d1285 (1990). 
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In this instance, the Massey Defendants came forward with the following evidence relevant to how 
Idahy obtained the appraisal: 
Idahy was not the Intended User of Massey's appraisal nor his Client under 
USP AP. R Vol. I, at 110-112; Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ii 8. 
There was no appraiser/client relationship between Massey and Idahy. R Vol. I, at 110-
112; Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ii 9, 10. 
• Massey has never spoken with anybody at Idahy and did not know ldahy had received a 
copy of the appraisal until after the borrowers, the Bruzas, already had defaulted. R Vol. 
I, at 110-112. 
Idahy does know how it obtained Massey's appraisal. R Vol. I, at 62-63. 
• Idahy did not obtain an assignment or transfer of the appraisal. R Vol. I, at 192-
193; Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ii 9. 
It would have been improper for Idahy to rely on an appraisal supplied by the 
borrowers. See Affidavit of Joe Huffman, at ii 14. 
Based on these facts, the District Court was on solid ground when it ruled that the 
Massey Defendants did not owe a tort duty to Idahy. Faced with this evidence, the Plaintiff was 
charged with adducing proof that somehow supported their theory of the case, which is 
notwithstanding the facts set forth throughout this brief, that the Massey Defendants breached a 
legal duty owed to the Plaintiffs subrogor. See Olsen v. J A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 
1285. But instead of demonstrating why it would be proper to rely on an appraisal potentially provided to it 
by the borrowers, or showing why you would not need to procure an assignment of the appraisal as testified 
by Mr. Menchaca, the Plaintiff argues that the District Court usurped the fact-finder's role. 
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The assertion simply lacks merit. The issue at the heart of the opposing motions for summary 
judgment was whether the Massey Defendants owed a legal duty. Implicitly contending that they did by 
arguing that the District Court usurped the fact-finder's role by seizing on a purported metaphysical 
uncertainty as to how Idahy obtained the appraisal and by stating the obvious -that the appraisal was 
generated by Massey for Clearwater Mortgage-- misses the issue. Of course, the appraisal came from 
Clearwater Mortgage in some sense, who after all, ordered it and tl1en rescinded it. But as Massey's and 
Menchaca's testin1ony establishes, it was not supposed to be released to, nor relied upon, by anybody, as 
there was no assignment. Furthermore, as Mr. Huffinan testified, it would have been improper for Idahy to 
rely on an appraisal provided by the bonowers. Yet despite these facts, which the Massey Defendants 
adduced and provided to the District Court, the Plaintiff did nothing to establish why it should be owed a 
legal duty under facts that are logically consistent with the possibility that someone at Idahy improperly 
obtained the appraisal from the bonowers or retrieved it from the "garbage." 
D. Because the Plaintiffs Appeal is Frivolous, the Supreme Court Should 
Award the Massey Defendants Attorneys' Fees Under Idaho Code § 12-121 
and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l). 
Attorneys' fees may be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54( e )(1) in cases where the Supreme Court finds the "case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation . . . ." See Peterson v. Private 
Wilderness, LLC, 152 Idaho 691, 699, 273 P.3d 1284, 1292 (2012). In an appeal, the Supreme 
Court will consider the "entire course of litigation" to determine if "any legitimate issues were 
presented." See id., 273 P.3d at 1292. The Supreme Court will deny attorneys' fees under these 
provisions if at "least one legitimate issue was raised." See id, 273 P.3d at 1292. 
Here, the Plaintiff did not raise one "legitimate issue," and, therefore, the Supreme Court 
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should award the Massey Defendants attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l). The Plaintiff's first issue, which is that the District Court 
misconstrued Idaho and federal law regarding whether Massey owed the Plaintiff a duty, was 
pursued frivolously and without foundation. First, at the District Court level the Plaintiff waived 
any discussion about the balance of harms test. Second, the Plaintiff failed to submit evidence 
(and indeed did not even meaningfully argue the issue at the District Court) supporting the 
existence of a legal duty owed. The Massey Defendants, by contrast, submitted the Affidavit of 
Joe Huffman, which supported their position that they did not owe the Plaintiff or its subrogor 
any tort duty under USPAP. Likewise, the Massey Defendants extensively briefed and argued 
the balance of harms test. 
The Plaintiff's second issue, which is that the District Court relied on evidence not in the 
record, specifically the Affidavit of Ernie Menchaca, also is frivolous. It is factually and 
demonstrably false because the Plaintiff's attorney stipulated in open court to the affidavit's 
admission into the record. Moreover, the Plaintiff invited error by so stipulating when, as the 
District Court implied, it should have known it lacked the affidavit and "inquir[ ed]" when they 
learned as much. Tr., May 10, 2012 hearing, at 30-31, 11. 20-3. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff's third issue, which is that the District Court relied on disputed 
material facts, faces a similar fate. The argument that Ms. Connie Miller was speaking on her 
own behalf and not Cumis's flies in the face of the facts and unequivocal law regarding 30(b)(6) 
depositions. Furthermore, the balance of Plaintiff's discussion on this issue lacks foundation, as 
discussed above, misconstrues and/or misapplies the standards governing motions for summary 
judgment, and frivolously tries to raise an issue of material fact when there is not one. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court should affirm the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Massey Defendants. The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 
why the District Court's ruling should be reversed and is owed a legal duty by the Massey 
Defendants. The Massey Defendants respectfully request that the Supreme Court award them 
attorneys' fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l). 
Respectfully Submitted this-~ day of March, 2013. 
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